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AcreageResponse Functions
for Eleven Egyptian Field Crops
Asa basis for appraising the impact of agricultural cooperatives and govern-
ment intervention in crop rotation and composition from around 1962—1963
onward, information about supply functions for major field crops was needed.
For well-known reasons, our efforts were concentrated on estimating acreage
response functions rather than supply functions. Misallocation is discussed in
terms of factor input rather than in terms of output.
Reasonably good information about acreage, yields, and prices is avail-
able from 1913 onward; it stands to reason that the data are more reliable for
later years than earlier ones. On the basis of data for the period 1913 to 1961,
response functions are estimated showing cultivators' behavior undisturbed by
government intervention. These are then used for predicting acreages for
1962—1968 at actual domestic and international prices. Comparison between
predicted and actual acreages yields information on the impact of government
interference with acreages. (See Chapter 7 for such comparisons.)
A MODEL FOR CROP ACREAGE RESPONSE
The model to be applied is, indeed, nothing but the production side of the
standard foreign trade modpl under competitive conditions.
Assume that land, A, labor, L, and water, W, are the only inputs in
agriculture. For crop i the production function is assumed to be
= Wi), £ =1,.., m (1)
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where q; is the quantity of crop i and y1(t)isa technical progress function.'
Assume that the total supplies of land, labor, and water are given exogenously
and are known. Thus we have:
A,A
(2)
Thedistribution of the inputs by crops is unknown except for land (see, how-
ever, [9, Tables 3.A, 3.B, and 3.C} on the list of references to Appendix A for
the years 1961, 1963, and 1964); thus it is not possible to estimate the pro-
duction functions (1) individually. Since our problem is one of the optimality
of the individual crops we would get no help from an aggregate production
function. The lack of information about the distribution of inputs by crops
does not prevent us, however, from estimating individual supply functions or,
as we prefer, individual acreage response functions.
We shall assume that all agricultural output prices are given exogenously,
determined either from abroad or by the government. Both assumptions are
reasonably good approximations in the Egyptian context (except perhaps for
some of the small crops). Our model is then based on the maximization of
total agricultural income,' and we have Max subject to the constraint&
(1)and (2).
With the inequality signs in (2) disregarded, maximization leads directly
to the necessary conditions, in easily understood notation,
YiPi 1,...,m—1, (3) )
YmPm
whichwith (2) givesus3m equations to determine and The
couldthen be determinedfrom (1). The optimal inputs of land, A1*, areseen
tobe functions of the ratios of output prices times the technical progress
function and of the total supplies of land, labor, and water, so that the acreage
response functions can be written
A*=A*(Y'P'A,L,W'\, i=1,...,m (4)
\Y'nPm /Jl,...,!fl
and similarly for the optimal inputs of labor and water, which, however, we
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All the arguments in (4) are directly observable and known, with the
exception of the technical progress functions,As a proxy for we shall
use yield per acre of crop i. The optimal input of land for any crop is thus a
function of all relative output values per acre and of the given total inputs of
land, labor, and water; all the arguments are now observable and known.
Yield per acre is, of course, influenced not only by technical progress but also
by inputs of labor and water per acre and is, thus, strictly endogenous to our
problem. It is clear, however, that for the individual crops in agriculture we
cannot rely upon the conventional type of technical progress functions =
exp(p2t),where isa constant rate of technical progress.4 For individual
crops, yields will tend to move in jumps at the introduction of new varieties,
over and above the effects of other types of technological progress. For agri-
culture as a whole it may perhaps be true that new varieties are introduced in
a more or less continuous stream (for underdeveloped countries even this as-
sumption is certainly dubious), but for individual crops we cannot make such
assumptions. Not only do new varieties only appear discretely, but yields may
even fall between the appearance of new varieties because old varieties may
degenerate. Thus, the yield of Egyptian cotton declined from about 1895 to
about 1920 due to degeneration of varieties, soil exhaustion, and an increasing
underground water table (an unexpected consequence of the old Aswaa dam),
and increased again from 1920 to 1940 due to new varieties and improved
fertilization and drainage [5, in particular, Fig. 10].
Since the number of crops and thus of relative output values per acre is
substantial (eleven) and the number of observations limited (at most forty.-
eight), we felt that we had to bring down the number of explanatory variables
in the acreage response functions. We shall do that through constructing for
each crop a relative output-value-per-f eddan index,that is defined as
F1= ,
, = (5)
whereis the weight given to crop jandy is interpreted as crop yield. As
weights we shall use the relative crop acreages, averages for the period of
estimation.5 F, may include all crops or only crops that are particularly com-
petitive in regard to land (see below).
The acreage response function for crop i may then be formulated linearly
as
A, =+ + + a4,L + (6)
or as the corresponding log linear function. We used only the linear form in
our estimates.6320 APPENDIX A
Note, however, that for any arbitrary crop, say crop m, we have
tn—i
rn—i tn—i /ni —1
1) (7)
so that, strictly speaking, (6) can apply to at most m —1crops. Our formula-
tion of the acreage response functions thus implies an unpleasant lack of
symmetry in the functional forms.
The next step is to introduce appropriate lags in the functions. We need
a lag specification that will permit us to predict both short- and long-term
responses or, to put it another way, to come out with both short- and long-
term elasticities of acreage response. Various possibilities are open, but before
we consider them a few comments upon the basic model may not be out
of place.
For our purposes the present model has the great advantage of permitting
us to predict acreages without having to consider possible effects on domestic
factor prices; these are themselves endogenous to the problem. Thus, we can
predict acreages on the basis of both domestic and international prices, in the
short term as well as in the long term, without having to "solve the general
equilibrium system," the usual headache in this problem. Identifying long-term
response with optimal acreage, our response equations help us, in other words,
to directly predict the optimum.
Strictly speaking, we have in fact solved that part of the general equi-
librium system that is necessary for our purpose. The point is that the standard
neoclassical trade model is dichotomized so that the supply (production) part
can be sojved without considering the demand side. It is this dichotomization
we take advantage of. Its basic assumptions are perfect competition and the
absence of nontraded outputs. There are problems with both of these assump-
tions but we do not consider them important (except for wheat)
Anotherbasic assumption for obtaining this neat result is that total sup-
plies of domestic resources are exogenously given. For land and water this
assumption is probably justified. The supply of cultivable land in the Nile
Valley and the Delta is highly_inela&tic, and water supply is ultimately deter-
mined by the water flow of the Nile. Efforts to increase water supply for indi-
vidual crops through a better distribution over the year and to increase the
cultivated area have been governmental on the whole.8 Some private invest-ACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR ELEVEN FIELD CROPS 321
ment in irrigation, drainage, and land reclamation did, of course, take place,
particularly before the Great Depression, and the cultivated area did respond
(downward) to the low relative profitability of agriculture during the Great
Depression. By and large we feel, nonetheless, that it is justified to consider
land and water as exogenously determined resources in the Egyptian context.
For labor the assumption is less obvious. Until World War II, when urbaniza-
tion was still slow, the assumption may not be too much out of line with
reality. And during the sixties, the military draft may have been the most
important determinant. With the rapid urbanization during and after World
War II and the opportunities offered outside agriculture, however, labor supply
to agriculture may not have been inelastic with respect to urban wages. Little
evidence exists, unfortunately, as to the extent Egypt's agricultural labor
supply depended upon urban wages, which is what matters in the present
context.9 The pull from the cities may have been of such a nature that urban
wages made little difference to the flow of migration out of agriculture.'0 Lack-
ing evidence to the contrary, we assume that the agricultural labor supply has
been highly inelastic with respect to urban wages during the whole period.
The following considerations should also be noted:
1. Data for the total resources A, L, and W are of widely differing
quality. Data for A are for acreage sown and are considered reliable, while
those for L are shaky, to put it mildly; as a proxy for L only an index based on
agricultural censuses of permanent labor taken every ten years, with inter-
polation on the basis of annual estimated rural population figures, is available.
For W we have data for the monthly discharge of the Nile at Aswan, which
may be fairly accurately measured itself but is at best a proxy for the use of
irrigation water on the fields. It does not consider water storage below Aswan
and this may be an important misspecification.
2. It is usual to divide Egyptian crops into three clearly distinguishable,
though somewhat overlapping, groups of competing crops, with limited com-
petition between groups 1 and 2:
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Summer (Autumn) Crops Winter Crops Perennial Crops






It is not obvious a priori whether for purposes of estimation we should
consider groups 1 and 3 together and 2 and 3 together and calculatecorre-
spondingly. We experimented with this division, but ended up by considering322 APPENDIX A
all crops as competing, so thatis defined in the same way for all crops. This
may not be the best possible specification for crops like rice, barley, and cane.
3. Our model does not consider inputs of. chemical fertilizers and this
may be another serious misspecification. If included in the model, relative
fertilizer price i = 1,..., m,would appear in equation (8).
We would then have eleven relative prices as arguments. Our relative output-
value index would now be inadequate because itis based on gross output
values and does not deduct imported inputs. If we knew the fertilizer input
per acre we could construct a nez output value (i.e. value added) index for
each crop corresponding to F; however, no back figures about fertilizer input
per acre by crops are available. Another possibility would be to let the argu-
ment appear in the response function for crop i. We do not have
comparable fertilizer prices from 1913 to 1961, and the functional form may
have changed over time [8]. In 1913 fertilizer input was negligible and over
time a learning process has accompanied the increasing input of fertilizer. We
have therefore not been able to include fertilizer prices as a determinant of
land inputs. Fortunately, however, we may catch most of the impact of ferti-
lizers through identifying the productivity factor,with yield.
4. Price information is not available for most of the years of the period
of estimation—1913 to 1961—for the largest (by acreage) of all crops, clover
(berseem), so that no estimates of the response function could be made for
the area of clover. The interdependency of the area response functions ex-.
pressed by equation (7) is therefore disregarded, and it is assumed that clover
is a residual in this sense. This procedure is not very satisfactory, of course,
but no other course seems to be open. More serious, perhaps is that the
output value per aére for clover does not appear in the denominator of the
relative output-value index, F, for the other crops. We have had to disregard
clover entirely.1'
5. No back data were available for output and prices of straw and
stalks, important for some crops (wheat, in particular). For cotton, of course,
both lint and seeds are included.
In regard to lag specification, we have chosen to follow the approach of
an exponentially distributed lag attached to relative output-value. We assume
that
+ + + + (8)
Generalreference is made to Koyck's original contribution [12] and
Nerlove's contributions [15, 16, and 171, as well as Krishna's [14] and Behr-
man's [3] modified versions of Nerlove's model. Nerlove came out with prices,
exponentially lagged, and the previous year's total acreage as the only ex-
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planatory variables. Krishna and later Behrman added relative yield as an
independent explanatory variable (among other things). Our derivation im-
plied that crop acreage should be made dependent upon relative output value,
that is (relative) price times yield. It might be argued that expectations are
formed quite differently for prices and yields [3, pp. 166—168]. A low price
last year and a bad crop last year may not affect this year's sown acreage in
the same way. A single crop failure may not change the cultivator's notions
of what is the "normal" yield, and he may understand that crop failures are
erratic events, although, of course, the notion of "normal" yield is subject to
change.'2 At the time a new variety is introduced it is natural that yield ex-
pectations should shift upward autonomously; indeed, this is the reason for its
introduction. Hence, a case can be made for separating prices and yields in
the supply function or, at least, treating them differently from an expectations
point of view. One way of handling this problem would be to define the yield
variable in F, as, say, an average of the last five years and limit the exponential
distribution to the price, although price and yield enter in a multiplicative
way. Estimates were experimentally made on the basis of this hypothesis, but
the results did not improve and the experiment was discarded.
The specification assumes that the present year's prices (and yields, of
course) do not affect sown acreages. This is because the prices used in the
estimates are those at which crops have actually been sold. For the major
crops these tend to be the market prices ruling at the time of sowing next
year's crop.
The total acreage, A, enters into (8) with a single lag in line with Ncr-
love's assumptions (which we keep although it is a bit difficult to see their
precise rationale). Labor is naturally assumed to have its effects without lags,
while water appears with the time indicator r.Forsummer crops (see the
list above) ristaken to be an average of the months May and June, the
critical time for rice. The rationale of this choice is that, whereas the other
summer crops (cotton, in particular) have always got the water they require
at zero prices for water, rice has traditionally (at least until the fifties) been
treated by the irrigation authorities as a residual crop. For winter and peren-
nial crops, ristaken to be September last year (the peak of the flood), which
is decisive for supply at the time winter crops are sown (November and
December).
Equation (8) then leads directly to
A, =ah+ + + + + a61L_,
+ + + (9)
In addition to the Nerlove specification, another one using Almon poly-
nominally distributed lags and a third one with a simple two-lag structure were324 APPENDIX A
tried out. However, both t and R2 and—particularly important for our purpose
—standard errors of estimated values for these two specifications were so poor
that the Nerlove model was preferred despite its inherent bias at ordinary
least squares estimation. For our main purpose, prediction, the bias isa
secondary consideration, but for the elasticity values, calculated as a by-
product, it may be a serious matter, of course. To avoid the bias, estimation by
the instrumental variable method was therefore applied (see below).
So much for the general specifications. One further problem had to be
tackled. The government has at times imposed area restrictions for cotton,
sometimes accompanied by prescriptions to increase cereals(particularly
wheat) production. During the period studied here, cotton area restrictions
were imposed for the years 1915, 1918, 1921—1923, 1927—1929, 193 1—1933,
1942—1947,and1953—1960 [5, Table III]. It would be natural simply to ex-
clude these years from the estimates. However, the loss of observations is
serious; also, the area restrictions may have merely imposed what the culti-
vators would have tended to do on their own; or, the restrictions may have
been evaded.
Two considerations usually guided successive governments in their area
restriction policies. In earlier years, it was always claimed by the Ministry of
Agriculture that peasants tended to cultivate more cotton than was socially
profitable in the long run (since cotton tends to exhaust the soil). Rightly or
wrongly, with this motivation the government has felt it necessary in years of
high profitability to hold back cotton cultivation, forcing peasants onto the
three-year rotation system. In other years, the government has ordered pro-
duction to be cut down 'because the market abroad was considered to be
weak. This motivation was certainly behind the restrictions in 1931—1933. It is
difficult to know a priori whether such restrictions led the cultivators to cut
down the area more than they would have done otherwise, but they clearly
did not work "against the market" in such years. For the 1942—1947 period
much the same could be said. With European markets cut off, prices would /
obviouslyhave fallen sharply had everything been left to the market forces,
and a steep decline in cotton acreage would probably also have occurred with-
out area restrictions. But there was the additional consideration that, cut off
from nitrate fertilizer supplies from abroad during several years, the risk for
soil exhaustion was great, even at a very low cotton acreage. And on top of all
that there were, of course, the food requirements of the Allied armies operating
from Egypt.
The restrictions from 1953 to 1960 are more difficult to rationalize. In
1953 they certainly tended to work in the same direction as the market forces,
considering the collapse of the Korean boom. But relative profitability was by
no means low, even after the cotton price drop in 1952 and despite the heavy
cotton export taxes levied in these years (see Chart A—l). The restrictionsACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR ELEVEN FIELD CROPS 325
were eased somewhat in 1954, but evasion must have become widespread,
too; the cotton area increased despite a further decline in relative output value
until 1956. After 1956, evasion was massive (see Chapter 6, p. 151). The
increasing need for food grain imports, related to population growth, was one
reason why the government tried to keep down the cotton area during these
years; hence the simultaneous prescriptions for the wheat acreages from 1955
onward. It should be noticed, finally, that the optimum tariff argument has
always played a role in policy debate in Egypt although opinions about its
applicability have differed widely [4].
To keep the number of observations as large as possible (that is, forty-
eight), an attempt was made to quantify the area restrictions rather than
delete all years with controls. In a sense that is a relatively simple matter
because the laws imposing the restrictions have always specified an upper
limit, expressed as a percentage of his holdings, to the individual cultivator's
cotton acreage. The laws were published in the Journal Officiel du Gouverne-
ment Egyptien, from which the following details about the restrictions were
compiled.
Until the end of the twenties the restrictions were simple. In each of the
years 1915, 1918, 1921—1923, and 1927—1929, the upper limit was one-third,
applying to any cultivator of land.13
During the period from 1931 to 1933 things became a bit more compli-
cated. In 1931 the restrictions were directed exclusively toward the then lead-
ing long staple variety, Sakellarides. Prices on long staple cotton had fallen
particularly sharply and the government tried to make cultivators keep long
staple production below the private optimum. For that purpose a distinction
was made between a "Zone Nord" of the Delta, including most districts in the
governorates Behera, Gharbeya, and Daqhaleya, and the rest of the agricul-
tural lands in the Delta and Upper Egypt. In the Zone Nord the upper limit for
Sakel was 40 percent; in the rest of the country it was simply forbidden. For
all other varieties there were no restrictions. The division between Zone Nord
and the rest is interesting because it was in the former that the large cotton
estates were situated. In 1932 restrictions were tightened. In Zone Nord the
upper limit was 30 percent for all varieties, including Sakel. In the rest of the
country the limit was 25 percent, with Sakel forbidden. In 1933 restrictions
were relaxed again and limited to Sakel for Zone Nord, with an upper limit of
40 percent; for the rest of the country there was a general maximum of 50
percent, with. Sakel forbidden.
The next period of restrictions was caused by World War II. For 1942
the upper limit in Zone Nord was 27 percent for all varieties; for the rest of
the lands it was 23 percent. Cotton cultivation was entirely forbidden on
basin-irrigated lands unless cotton had been grown there earlier. It was also
prescribed that cotton must be preceded by clover, and that it was not per-326 APPENDIX A
mitted for two consecutive years on the same land. Certain long staple varie-
ties (Zagora and Malaki) were forbidden or subject to special limits. This
set of restrictions was in force for the years 1942, 1943, and 1944. For
1945 and 1946, the limits were unchanged at 27 percent for Zone Nord, but
a further reduction to 18 percent was decreed for the rest of the country. A
special limit of 14 percent was introduced for old basin lands that had been
converted to summer irrigation and cotton cultivation was forbidden corn-
pletely in the Aswan govemorate. We were not able to find any law in the
Journal Officiel for 1946 and 1947 applying to the 1947 crop or abrogating
earlier laws, so we have assumed that the rigorous limits of 1946 applied
here too (supported by [5, Table III]).
From the agricultural year 1942—43 (November—October) to 1945—46,
there were area prescriptions for wheat and barley. For 1942—43, Zone Nord
had a lower limit of 45 percent for wheat and barley (with at least 20 percent
wheat) and the rest of the lands, 60 percent (with at least 50 percent wheat).
These limits were applied also to 1944—45 and continued through 1945—46
with a minor modification.
For 1953 the upper limit for cotton was 30 percent for all cultivators and
varieties. From 1954 to 1958 the upper limit of 30 percent remained in force
for Zone Nord, but was increased to 37 percent for the rest of the Delta and
Upper Egypt. For 1959 and 1960, finally, it was 33 percent for all cultivators
and varieties.
Note, in addition, that from 1955 to 1959 there was a lower limit to
wheat identical with the upper limit to cotton.
Although there have been restrictions for cotton and, for some years,
also prescriptions for wheat and barley, we shall use only a single variable to
express the impact of the controls on actual acreage. The rationale of this
decision is mainly that the prescriptions for wheat have been highly correlated
with those for cotton. We hope, therefore, that a variable based on the cotton
acreage restrictions alone will capture the impact of all the controls on all
the crops.
The question is now how to translate the upper limits for individual culti-
vators Into a constraint on the total cotton acreage. What complicates matters
is, of course, that cotton is cultivated by farmers who do not grow it exclusively
but as one crop in rotation with others.
As an extreme case, assume first that half the total land in Egypt is on a
three-year rotation and the other half, on a two-year rotation, and that all culti-
vators apply a simultaneous-consecutive rotation system, so that a cultivator
grows cotton each year on one rotating part of his land. With a three-year
rotatibn, a cultivator would thus always have one third of his land planted
with cotton; on a two-year rotation, half his land would always be planted
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It is immediately clear that with this model an upper limit percent
would imply no reduction at all in the total cotton acreage, for no cultivator
would at any time use more than 50 percent of his land for cotton.
At an upper limit percent but percent, cultivators with a
two-year rotation would be forced to cut down their cotton acreage, but culti-
vators with a three-year rotation would be unaffected. It is easily seen that in
this interval each percentage point for which the maximum is below 50 will
force a cultivator on a two-year rotation to limit his actual cotton acreage by
two percent of the acreage he would choose were there no limitations. And
since half the land is assumed to be on two-year rotation, the reduction of the
total cotton acreage is simply 2 times 0.6 (because 60 percent of the cotton
land at no restrictions is in two-year rotation), or equal to 1.2 percent. The
total reduction caused by the maximum percent would thus be 50 minus the
maximum percent times 1.2. At a maximum of 33½ percent, the reduction
would be 20 percent of the free acreage.
At an upper limit percent, cultivators with three-year rotation
will have to cut down their cotton acreages, too. A fall in the upper limit by
one percentage point will now force cultivators on three-year rotation to cut
down their cotton acreage by 3 percent of their cotton acreage at no restric-1
tions. Cultivators with two-year rotation will have to reduce their cotton
acreage, as before, by a further two percent measured upon their acreage at
no restrictions. The combined effect is a reduction by 2.0 times 0.6 + 3.0
times 0.4, or by 2.4 percent of total cotton acreage without controls.
The relation between upper limit for the individual cultivator and reduc-
tion of total cotton acreage is thus nonlinear. It has a kink at 50 percent and
another one at 33½ percent. In the intervals between 100 and 50, 50 and
331/3,and33½ and 0 it is linear as shown in Chart A—i (the broken line
OABC).
As another extreme model, we could imagine that all farmers, whether
on two- or three-year rotation, rotate consecutively so that at any time they
have only one crop on all their land. In any particular year we should then
expect one third of the farmers on three-year rotation and half the farmers
on two-year rotation to cultivate all their land with cotton and the remainder
to have no cotton at all that year. In this case the total cotton acreage would
simply be reduced to the upper limit and the area reduction would be repre-
sented in Chart A—I by the 450 line through the origin, OC.
Our assumption that half the land of those who cultivate cotton at all is
on three-year rotation and half on two-year rotation may not be entirely un-
realistic (see Chapter 6, note 8).14 Moreover, peasants usually follow the
patterns of the first model with simultaneous-consecutive rotation. But big
cultivators might, for reasons of large-scale economies, prefer the system with
consecutive, nonsimultaneous rotation. It stands to reason, therefore, that the328 APPENDIX A
CHART A—i
Limits to and Reduction of Cotton Acreage
Reductionof cotton
acreage, per cent
aggregaterelationship between individual maximum limit and total acreage
reduction is a nonlinear relationship similar to the curve in Figure A—i pass-
ing through the origin and the point C (0, 100) and running between the
lineand the broken line OABC. Calling the rate of acreage reduction K, and the
maximum limit (expressed as a ratio) x, a relationship such as K =(1—x)4
might be reasonable, considering the actual maximal ratios and the actual re-
duction in-cotton acreage in the years when limits are imposed. At x =0.5,the
cotton acreage reduction would be about 6 percent; at x =0.33,about 20 per-
cent; and at x =0.25,about 35 percent.
Finally, we have to consider the evasion of controls. A glance at upper
limits and actual cotton acreages (Chart A—i) reveals immediately what is
confirmed by all observers and certainly should be expected in Egypt—that
evasion at times has been considerable. It would appear that under "normal"
conditions, restrictions are effective the first year after their introduction, but
that thereafter, in a sequence of control years, evasion rapidly takes the upperACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR ELEVEN FIELD CROPS 329
hand. It may take the form of farmers with consecutive, nonsimultaneous
rotation shifting to simultaneous rotation. With a three-year rotation, an
upper limit of 331/3percentwould then cut the acreage in the first year but
have no effect whatever during the following year. This kind of evasion could
even be legal. The years of World War II seem to have been an exception to
this rule: not until the war was over did evasion become massive. We have
assumed that for 1922 and 1923, 1928 and 1929, 1946 and 1947, and 1955
to 1960 evasion was so general that these years can be considered as having
been without controls.
The construction of Table A—I will now be readily understood. In col-
umn 1 we have, on the basis of the information given above, gauged an aver-
age figure for the individual cultivator's upper limit. For some years there was,
indeed, only a single limit, but for most years an average had to be calculated.
In doing so we tried particularly to gauge the importance of Zone Nord. The
values for the control variable to be applied in the regressions appear in col-
umn 4. Needless to say, the table is based on a certain amount of subjective
judgment.
To equation (9) we can now add a new term, a91K, where K is the area
reduction calculated in column (4) of Table A—i. We graft the controls vari-
able K directly on (9) rather than on (8) because we have also considered
"adaptation," or evasion. But it is not clear whether this is the best method of
procedure.15
We should expectto be negative for cotton and positive for other
crops. Equation (9) then becomes
=a1,+ a21(F1)1+ + a41A..2 (9')
+ a51L + + + + a91K + a101(A1)j
wherethe coefficients are related as follows:









Relations (iii) to (ix) may be used for testing the quality of the estimate.
For sources of data, see [7], [2], [1], [6], and Table A—i. The series used
are presented in [9].TABLE A-i
The Impact of Upper Limits to Cotton Cultivation
Average Prescribed Rate
Upper Limit of Reduction of Control
to Cultivator's Total Acreage Variable
Acreage,x (%) 1 —x (1 —x)4 K
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
1915 33½ 0.67 0.20 0.20
1918 (33½) 0.67 0.20 0.20
1921 1 1 0.20
1922k 33½ 0.67 0.20 0
1923a j 0
1927 1 1 0.20
1928a 33½ 0.67 0.20 0
1929a j 0
1931 45 0.55 0.09 0.09
1932 25 0.75 0.32 0.32
1933 45 0.55 0.09 0.09
1942 24 0.76 0.33 0.33
1943 24 0.76 0.33 0.33
1944 24 0.76 0.33 0.33
1945 22 0.76 0.33 0.33
1946a 20 0.80 0.41 0
1947a (20) 0.80 0.41 0
1953 30 0.70 0.24 0.24
1954 33 0.67 0.20 0.20
1955a 33 0.67 0.20 0
1956a 33 0.67 0.20 0
1957a 33 0.67 0.20 0
1958a 33 0.67 0.20 0
33 0.67 0.20 0
1960&1 33 0.67 0.20 0
All other
years 100 0 0 0
SoJ.mcEs: Journal Officiel du Gouvernernen: Egyptien, 1915, No. 85; 1921, Nos. 86
and 92; 1927, No. 5; 1931, Nos. 13 and 96; 1932, No. 100; 1941, No. 142; 1942, No.
174; 1942, No. 180; 1943, No. 92; 1944, No.25;1944, No. 107; 1946, No. 1; Economic
Bulletin, N.B.E.,variousissues;Brown, op. cit., and Hansen and Marzouk, op. cit., pp.
98—99.
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METHODOF ESTIMATION'6
Multiple least squares regression tends to yield biased estimates of models
like ours. This lagged variables model may, however, be considered as belong-
ing to the class of general "noisy" or "errors in variables" model. It is known
that the method of instrumental variables yields consistent estimates for gen-
eral "noisy" models. This method has not found much application in econo-
metrics because the approach has been to obtain the instrumental variables
from outside the model, an impractical method that yields estimates with
larger variances than those of least squares.
It can be shown, however, that instrumental variables may be obtained
from within the and that the optimum instrumental variables matrix
is the matrix of the noise-free variables of the model multiplied by the inverse
variance covariance matrix of the error (disturbance) vector.'7 The term
"optimum" is here used in the sense of yielding consistent estimates with the
smallest variances. The latter can be shown to approach asymptotically those
of the least squares' estimates. These desired properties of unbiasedness and
least variances have been proven, theoretically, for the asymptotic case; yet, in
all finite sample problems studied so far, the optimum instrumental variables
method has, in fact, been always giving better results than least squares.'8
Mathematically, our model is
=+ Zj43i + Z,,f32+ . + ++ + c,
and for T observations we can write
Y = + €,
whereY is a T vector, X is a T x (n + i + 1) matrix, f3 is a (n + i + 1) vec-
tor, andisa T vector.
Given the model, the optimum instrumental variables are obtained by
adaptive, or recursive, estimation using the computer program ESTIMM as
follows. First, the program yields the ordinary least squares estimate (L.S.).
It then procdeds to obtain a so-called noise-free estimate of the endogenous
variables, Ye. The noise-free estimate is obtained as the solution of the model
with the yeS as unknowns, and using the values of the coefficients,emerging
from the least squares estimate together with the actually observed values of
the exogenous variables, z. The lagged endogenous variables, ye—i to ap-
pearing on the right hand side are, of course, unknown and obtained from the
solution (with the exception of those with an earlier dating than 0 for which
the actually observed values had to be used). The error term, c, that is the
"noise," is deleted (set equal to zero) to obtain a solution of ye, "free of332 APPENDIX A
noise." The noise-free estimate of the endogenous variables is then used in the
instrumental variables matrix to replace the "noisy," actually observed, values
of the endogenous variables. For the other variables, the actually observed
values were used as instrumental variables in this case. On this basis a new esti-
mate of the model is made and this is the instrumental variable estimate, step
1 (I.V.1).
On the basis of the coefficient values obtained in I.V.1, the program then
calculates a new noise-free estimate of the endogenous variables to obtain a
new instrumental variables matrix in the same way as was done after the L.S.
Thereafter, the program checks for first-order correlation among the errors,
and estimates the inverse variance covariance matrix on the assumption that
the errors follow a first-order autoregressive scheme. The inverse matrix (if
obtained) is used with the new step 2 instrumental varinbies matrix to yield
the instrumental variable estimate of the model, step 2 (I.V.2).
Summarizing, the least squares estimate (L.S.) is
f3L.S. =(XTX)_1X1'Y.
The instrumental variable estimate, step 1 (I.V.1) is
th.v.i(X1TX)_'X1TY
where X1 is the first noise-free estimate of X.
The instrumental variable estimate, step 2 (I.V.2) is
(X2T —iy
whereX2 is the seôond noise-free estimate of X and fl is the variance covari-
ance matrix of the errors.
For the present model some of the matrices to be inverted turned out to
be almost singular because they contained both unlagged and lagged values of
exogenous variables that change very slowly over time. In such cases, normal
precision of the computer (IBM/360) was insufficient and double precision
had to be used. Some matrices were, however, so close to singularity that even
double precision did not prevent instability. These cases have been labeled
"not ajplicable" in Table A—2.
In all estimates we used the standard formula for R2
R2 =
where et are the residuals. This formula applies strictly to the L.S. and we
have, of course, 0R21. Applying the same formula to the I.V., we can
only be sure, however, that R21, so that the computations may yield neg-
ative values of R2.
Durban-Watson statistics were not computed because the program cor-
rects automatically for the presence of autocorrelated errors in I.V.2; in theACREAGE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS FOR ELEVEN FIELD CROPS 333
case of L.S., the Durban-Watson statistic is uninteresting because L.S. of this
model yields biased estimates in any case. It might have been useful, however,
to use them for LV.! where I.V.2 failed.
RESULTS OF ESTIMATIONS
In most cases the three methods—L.S., I.V. 1, and I.V.2—gave very similar
results, implying that the bias involved in L.S. cannot be very serious in this
particular case. For the lagged crop area there is, however, a substantial dif-
ference between the coefficients obtained for some crops (onions, beans, len-
tils); here the unbiased estimates give much larger coefficients than L.S.
For theoretical reasons we prefer to use the results of I.V.2 whenever
available. For several crops the I.V.2 had to be abandoned, however, for com-
putational reasons or because the coefficient of the lagged area variable was
>1,implying instability. In these cases I.V.1 was used. In one case I.V.1 also
led to instability, and the L.S. results were used.
The findings are shown in Table A—2. Acreages are measured in thou-
sands of feddans and water, in billions of cubic meters; labor is expressed as
an index, with average labor force 1950—1955 =100;F is a pure number
defined by equation (5); and K is defined in Table A—i. Figures in brackets
under the coefficient values are the corresponding tvalues.R2 values and SER
values (standard error of estimate) are given in columns 13 and 14, while
column 15 indicates which estimate has been selected for calculating elastici-
ties—shown in Table 6—3—and for the area predictions. Although our main
interest is in the predictions, a few remarks about the details of the estimates
are warranted. (We limit ourselves to the estimates selected for prediction.)
The R2 values differ considerably, from 0.95 for cane to 0.39 for lentils.
For five crops, R2 exceeds 0.80. The standard error of regression, SER, is
generally about 5—10 percent of the actual acreage at the end of the period
of prediction; barley is an exception, with more than 35 percent. Thus, the
fits cannot claim any high degree of accuracy, but compared with similar
estimates for other countries they are not too bad.
Concerning coefficients, we note first that that of the control variable,
K, has the expected sign for all summer crops and wheat—negative for cotton
and positive for rice, corn, millet, and wheat—and is significantly different
from zero at the 1 percent level. For other crops the sign of the coefficient
of K is erratic and insignificant, as should be expected.
The coefficient of the relative output-value variable, F, has in all cases
a positive sign, except for corn. The sign of the coefficient is significant at the
1 percent level for cotton, barley, onions, beans, lentils, and helba, and at the
5 percent level, for rice and cane. For the important food grains, corn, wheat,
and millet, it is insignificant.334 APPENDIXA
TABLE A-2








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cotton
L.S. 245.48 0.17 —0.02 2.31 —2.22
(3.24) (1.08)(—0.12) (0.85)(—0.83)
I.V.1 252.22 0.14 0.01 2.65 —2.54
(3.39)(0.89) (0.08) (0.96)(—0.95)
I.V.2 293.44 0.16 0.00 2.23 —2.13
(4.02)(1.08) (0.00) (1.15)(—1.11)
Rice
L.S. 177.92 0.12 —0.09 —3.11 3.37
(2.19)(1.22)(—1.00)(—1.68) (1.84)




L.S. —136.69 0.04 0.19 4.64 —4.96
(—0.77) (0.21) (1.30) (1.70)(—1.82)
I.V.1 —78.48 0.40 0.13 7.33 —7.97
(—0.42) (1.81) (1.09) (2.31)(—2.46)
I.V.2 Not applicable
Millet
L.S. 28.02 0.01 —0.05 —2.92 3.10
(0.40) (0.17)(—0.69)(—2.22) (2.39)




L.S. 75.44 0.09 —0.03 1.92 —1.41,
(0.63)(0.73)(—0.26) (1.14)(—0.88)
I.V.l 78.80 0.05 —0.01 2.18 —1.67
(0.68)(0.36)(—0.06) (1.32)
I.V.2. 83.24 0.05 0.01 1.31 —0.86
(0.80)(0.47) (0.06) (0.83)(—0.58)
Barley
L.S. 112.38 —0.05 0.03 1.08 —1.13
(1.96)(—1.24) (0.65) (1.53)(—1.65)
I.V.1 114.96 —0.05 0.03 0.85 —0.36
(1.97)(—1.17) (0.65) (1.16)(—1.20)
I.V.2 144.97 —0.02 0.02 —0.13 0.10
(3.63)(—0.74) (0.69)(—0.18) (0.15)









(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
—73.11 10.02 —1,901.50 0.27 —37.00 0.86 138.86
(—1.71) (0.23)(—9.21)(3.67) (—0.07)
—73.22 6.66 —1,947.16 0.22 —11.30 0.86 139.54
(—1.70) (0.15)(—9.42)(2.78) (—0.02)
—67.29 —4.37—1,910.95 0.18 —19.46 0.85 142.00 x
(—1.87)(—0.11)(—10.01)(2.41) (—0.03)
169.37 8.11 318.18 0.08 —742.50 0.87 83.03
(6.54) (0.24) (2.85) (0.52) (—2.08)
167.87 —4.61 327.14 0.16 —685.06 0.87 83.18 x
(6.63)(—0.11) (3.45)(0.73) (—1.82)
—44.98 34.72 658.69 0.29 77.00 0.64 129.29
(—1.13) (0.85) (3.23) (1.33) (0.12)
—51.31 22.00 933.82 —0.24 —700.15 0.61 134.05 x
(—1.23) (0.51) (4.76)(—0.63) (—1.11)
21.58 1.18 388.73 0.43 217.97 0.87 59.45
(1.16) (0.06) (2.89)(3.47) (0.97)
21.64 1.34 390.20 0.43 217.01 0.87 59.45 x
(1.15) (0.07) (3.79) (2.59) (0.99)
—6.19 —7.89 576.43 0.14 593.00 0.69 96.47
(—1.51)(—1.78) (3.93)(0.99) (1.49)
—6.24 —7.40 556.91 0.23 599.24 0.69 95.96
(—1.53) (—1.66) (3.74) (1.16) (1.52)
—6.37 —7.60 529.94 0.25 534.38 0.69 96.67 x
(—1.68)(—1.85) (3.92)(1.45) (1.65)
—1.56 —4.39 12.87 0.74 328.31 0.88 39.05
(—0.94) (—2.50) (0.19) (8.99) (2.00)
—1.66 —4.30 —8.56 0.86 248.28 0.88 39.84
(—0.99)(—2.40)(—0.13)(8.57) (1.44)





































































































































(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
0.69 0.34 —11.70 0.47 —112.95 0.69 6.76 x
(2.41) (1.07) (—1.11) (2.83) (—3.69)
0.69 0.26 4.32 1.12 —64.52 0.52 8.42
(1.96) (0.66) (0.28) (3.13) (—1.43)
1.26 —1.29 83.01 0.39 215.50 0.60 47.11
(0.61) (—0.61) (1.00) (2.46) (1.05)
2.07 —1.01 65.33 0.75 0.22 0.57 49.14 x
(0.99) (—0.46) (0.75) (2.49) (0.00) .
1.00 —0.42 —4.87 0.18 13.00 0.43 8.76
(2.68) (—1.00) (—0.36) (1.06) (0.38)
0.91 —0.63 —5.85 0.44 8.87 0.39 9.01 x
(2.19) (—1.00) (—0.42) (0.73) (0.25)
0.73 —0.37 —12.97 0.64 19.75 0.70 11.74
(1.48) (—0.67) (—0.73) (4.83) (0.38)
















—0.10 0.18 18.19 0.90 —14.30 0.95 5.13
(—0.46) (0.75) (2.49)(14.02) (—0.64)


















The coefficients for the lagged and unlagged primary inputs, land, labor,
and water, are generally insignificantly different from zero. Only in the case
of water input in rice do we have definite expectations a priori with respect
to sign, i.e., a positive sign for the unlagged water variable; the sign is, in fact,
positive and highly significant. For the input coefficients a test was indicated
on p. 329, according to which the product of the coefficient of the lagged
variable and the coefficient of the lagged crop area should be equal to the
coefficient of the unlagged variable with opposite sign. Since the coefficient of
the lagged variable in all cases is positive, except corn, we should, as a mull-
mum, require the lagged and the unlagged coefficients to have opposite signs
(except for corn). According to this sign test, the estimates are satisfactory
in 23 out of 33 cases.
The coefficient of the lagged crop area falls between 0 and 1 in most
cases and is < 1 in all cases selected for predictions; only in one case (corn)
is it negative. The significance of the sign of this coefficient is generally high.
For seven crops it is significant at the 1 percent level, and only for three (rice,
corn, and wheat) is it insignificant at the 5 percent level.
PREDICTIONS OF ACREAGES, 1962-1968
Three different predictions were made for the years 1962 to 1968.
Two were made on the basis of equation (9'), with estimated coefficient
values inserted and K Ø•19Inprediction 1, actual domestic ex-farm prices
were used for calculating F, the relative profitability index; in prediction 2,
actual international prices (f.o.b. or c.i.f., depending upon whether the com-
modity is exported or imported) were used for F. These predictions were
sequential in the sense that the acreages forecast for one year were used for
predicting acreages for the following year. Prediction 3, finally, was made on
the basis of the stationary form of equation (9), with K =0for all years,
and with actual international prices used for calculating F.
The data used for the predictions are presented in[9, tables], and
the calculated. F-values are shown in Table A—4. The results of the predic-
tions appear in Table A—3 and are depicted, with the actual acreages, in
Charts 7—1 to 7—11.340 APPENDIXA
TABLE A-4
Relative Value of Output per Feddan, 1961—1968






















Ex-farm 1.38 1.77 1.79 1.96 1.70 1.43 1.51 1.74































SOURCE: Our calculations. For definition of F1, see p. 319.
a. In all calculations involving relationships between Helba and other crops values
forHelba are atex-farm prices. This, however, is of importance only for the "interna-























1 1595 1637 1691 1693 1551 1388 1376
2 1677 1755 1792 1782 1626 1543 1585
3 1796 1740 1800 1539 1495 1485 1539
Riceb
1 674 720 677 859 1126 1316 1458
2 745 822 787 966 1242 1408 1557
3 834 852 786 1111 1314 1432 1549
Comb
1 1705 1725 1763 1783 1725 1662 1667
2 1719 1752 1821 1850 1783 1735 1755
3 1810 1765 1745 1607 1659 1613 1694
Millet5
1 438 433 415 400 462 548 597
2 437 434 407 384 443 528 577
3 453 464 460 547 581 612 616
Wheat5
1 1462 1456 1506 1523 1588 1706 1757
2 1444 1444 1502 1526 1585 1696 1744
3 1410 1486 1109 1434 1694 1700 1715
Barley'
1 148 138 155 159 154 207 257
2 156 147 146 132 135 193 233
3 (—108) 187 167(—273) 1279 1089 961
Beans5
1 385 404 399 422 388 376 332
2 352 335 312 312 277 268 223
3 320 231 218 237 248 87 217
Onions5
1 53 50 47 50 48 40 39
2 55 57 56 61 59 52 60
3 70 54 49 55 36 42 36
Lentils5
1 87 89 87 89 72 64 58
2 90 81 79 87 73 68 59
3 78 73 70 78 71 63 71
Helba*
1 66 68 68 73 61 61 57
2 (67) (61) (56) (58) (47) (47) (40)
3 (92) (61) (39) (51) (75) (42) (1)
Cane'
1 107 102 94 82 79 82 86
2 105 98 97 86 79 79 80
3 88 133 89 52 46 35 44
NOTE:Prediction 1: Short-term,based on actual ex-farm prices.
Prediction2: Short-term, based on actual international prices.
Prediction 3: Long-term, based on actual international prices and stationary
form.





























































































































1. With complementarities (externalities) between crops, such as the important
externality between clover and cotton (see Chapter 6), the production function should be
written as A,). This reformulation, important for the determination
of land rentals, for instance, is of no consequence for our problem because it does not
change the general form of the area response functions.
2. It would make no difference for our purpose if we assumed that maximization
took place at the individual farm level.
3. Paul A. Samuelson [20, p. 5fl has made a fundamental point about models of the
type applied here: With commodity prices determined exogenously, with homogeneous
production functions, or long-term equilibrium (in the sense that there is no surplus or
loss in any line of actual production when factors have been paid according to their
marginal productivity), and with the number of commodities exceeding that of factors,
the number of commodities actually produced in equilibrium (if it exists) cannot exceed
the number of factors. We work in principle with 12 commodities (including clover) and
3 factors; on Samuelson's specifications, 3 crops should be cultivated at most. But the 12
crops we are studying have, in fact, been cultivated during the whole period.
From a purely theoretical point of view, in the case of agriculture, Samuelson's point
is not terribly damaging. If we insist upon disaggregating commodities there is no good
reason why we should not disaggregate factors as well. A classification of land by
fertility and of labor by age and sex would supply us with a large number of factors;
land prices and rentals do in fact differ according to fertility, and wages, according to age
and sex. Indeed, going to the extreme and considering each person and each acre as a
special factor of production, we would end up with about 10 million factors—much more
than what even the finest actual market classification of commodities would produce (in
1961 cotton was marketed in 9 varieties and 13 grades, making altogether 117 cotton
commodities). All this does not help the present model, however, because we have
chosen to work with 12 actually produced commodities and 3 factors.
Samuelson's point, nonetheless, does not apply to our setup—not just because we
have not explicitly assumed either homogeneity of production functions or long.term
equilibrium, but, rather, because in our case not all factors are paid according to their
marginal productivity. Water is delivered free of charge but is not generally available to
the point where its marginal productivity is zero. In this sense agriculture is not in full
market equilibrium and this circumstance saves us from Samuelson's point. The optimum
that we are defining does, however, assume the best possible distribution of water; since
market forces do not take care of the distribution of water, the assumption is clearly that
theauthorities distribute water optimally, and thatis,of course,arather bold
assumption.
4. Our specification, that technical progress is Hicks-neutral, may, of course, be
misleading.
5. Estimates were first made with variable weights, based on previous years'
acreages. However, government restrictions on cotton acreages led to violent fluctuations
in actual acreages which strongly affected the relative output value index. To make the
index independent of such restrictions, constant weights were chosen.
6. In specifying the area response functions as linear in F, we have, in effect, made
them nonlinear in the (relative)prices. The nonlinearity follows directly from the
definition of F1. With two crops we would, for instance, have
F1=
YiPi= 1
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Ifthe coefficient of F1 is positive, the area, A1, is an increasing function of pi. As
pi goes from 0 to +00, F1 goes from 0 to 11w1, which means that A1 goes from a
certain lower value to an upper limit. The area response curve, depicting the area as a
function of its own crop price, is thus concave as seen from the price axis, which is in
line with the traditional assumption of decreasing returns in agriculture. Furthermore, the
existence of an upper limit to the crop area is consistent with traditional notions about
the conditions of cotton and rice cultivation in Egypt (see Chapter 6, pp. 145—146).
7. Strictly speaking, a further assumption is that domestic prices are independent of
whether commodities are exported or imported. Even without trade taxes, this assump-
tion means disregarding the c.i.f.-f.o.b. gap, which, however, is relatively small for most
agricultural products. The assumption is much more dubious in respect to trade taxes,
since it implies that a given commodity is either taxed at import or subsidized at export
at the same rate. It so happens that in our case this assumption is fulfilled to some extent
because the government has kept ex-farm prices independent of whether export or
import takes place. (A case in point is rice.) In any case, we assume that we know in
advance whether a commodity will be exported or imported.
8. The possibility cannot be excluded, however, that in distributing water over the
year, the government may actually have reacted to international prices; see Chapter 7, p.
176. Also, in its investment policies for agriculture the government may have taken into
account private profitability.
9. If rural labor supply depends upon relative wage levels, we should replace L
by the ratio between urban wage rate and agricultural output prices in our area response
functions. The rural wage rate would be endogenous to our problem. Depending upon
the nature of the labor supply function, other variables might have to be included in the
response functions, such as time, prices of manufactured consumer goods, unemployment
risks, et cetera.
10. A special study made in connection with the ILO-I.N.P. Rural Employment
Survey did not single out wages as a particularly important motive for migration; see [19].
11. Since clover is complementary to cotton, it should have a negative weight in
F,0,,,,; and vice versa for cotton in Fciov,r.Sincewe have used positive weights for all
crops in all F, we have in fact assumed away all complementarities. Here is another
possible misspecification of the model.
12. An experiment was made with predicting the 1962 cOtton area on the basis of
the actual yield in 1961 (which was about ½ of the "normal") and a "normal" yield.
The actual yield predicted more accurately than the "normal" yield.
13. The JournalOfficielis not available in any U.S. library for the years 1917 and
1918. We have assumed that for 1918 the limit was one-third, as it actually was in all the
other restriction years until 1929.
14. Note: our assumption that half the land is on two-year rotation and half on
three-year rotation is of importance only for the ordinate of the kink at 33½ percent. At
a higher proportion of land on three-year rotation the kinked curve would run a little
lower, between 50 and 0.
15. If there were no problem of evasion of controls, the K variable should un-
doubtedly appear in equation (8) and thus appear in (9') both lagged and unlagged like
the other variables. For, assume that K appears unlagged in (9'), as is the case now, and
that area restrictions were introduced for one single year and then removed. With (9')
there would then be a fall in the crop area in the period of control, as there should be;
but there would also be a negative effect (diminishing over time) on the area during the
following periods from the lagged crops area, The actual reactions of the farmers
might, in fact, even be the opposite: after a year of restriction they might tend to cultivate
more cotton that they otherwise would. A lagged K variable would take care of that. To
that extent (9') is clearly misspecified.
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We are, however, also confronted with the problem of evasion. We have "solved"
thatproblemsimply by deciding a priori that in a series of control years, evasion will be
completein all oratleastsome ofthe later years in the series.It stands to reason that
evasion will increase gradually from year to year. The actual specification does takecare
of that problem: when we set the control variable at 0 despite its continued existence, its
effects for the previous years will continue (at a diminishing rate) through the lagged
crop area. Considering our assumptions about evasion years in Table A—i, it will be
seen that the specification of (9') therefore makes sense for the control periods 1921-.
1923, 1927—1929, 1942—1947, and 1953—1960, but hardly for the single control years
1915, 1918, and the years 1931—1933. And there is always a problem with the years
immediately following a series of control years.
For most of the control years our specification may thus be defended, but it is clearly
not fully satisfactory. With a more complicated lag structure for the control variable the
specification could perhaps be improved.
16. This section was written by Rabab A. Kreidieh.
17. For details, see [13].
18.Ibid.
19. It was not possible to use the Kvariablefor the period of prediction because the
controls here took on other forms. For the period of estimation thecottonarea restric-
tion always fixed an upper limit to the acreage and left it to the cultivators to decide the
area below this limit. During the period of prediction the government imposed a certain
acreage upon the cultivators.
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Definitionof Concepts and
Delineation of Phases
DEFINITIONOF CONCEPTS USED IN THE PROJECT
Exchange Rates.
1. Nominal exchange rate: The official parity for a transaction. For
countries maintaining a single exchange rate registered with the International
Monetary Fund, the nominal exchange rate is the registered rate.
2. Effective exchange rate (EER): The number of units of local cur-
rency actually paid or received for a one-dollar international transaction. Sur-
charges, tariffs, the implicit interest forgone on guarantee deposits, and any
other charges against purchases of goods and services abroad are included, as
are rebates, the value of import replenishment rights, and other incentives to
earn foreign exchange for sales of goods and services abroad.
3. Price-level-deflated (PLD) nominal exchange rates: The nominal ex-
change rate deflated in relation to some base period by the price level index
of the country.
4. Price-level-deflated EER (PLD-EER): The EER deflated by the
price level index of the country.
5. Purchasing-power-parity adjusted exchange rates: The relevant (nom-
inal or effective) exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the foreign price
level to the domestic price level.
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Devaluation.
1. Gross devaluation: The change in the parity registered with the IMF
(or, synonymously in most cases, de jure devaluation).
2. Net devaluation: The weighted average of changes in EERs by
classes of transactions (or, synonymously in most cases, de facto devalua-
tion).
3. Real gross devaluation: The gross devaluation adjusted for the in-
crease in the domestic price level over the relevant period.
4. Real net devaluation: The net devaluation similarly adjusted.
Protection Concepts.
1. Explicit tariff: The amount of tariff charged against the import of a
good as a percentage of the import price (in local currency at the nominal
exchange rate) of the good.
2. Implicit tariff (or, synonymously, tariff equivalent): The ratio of the
domestic price (net of normal distribution costs) minus the c.i.f. import price
to the c.i.f. import price in local currency.
3. Premium: The windfall profit accruing to the recipient of an import
license per dollar of imports. It is the difference between the domestic selling
price (net of normal distribution costs) and the landed cost of the item (in-
cluding tariffs and other charges). The premium is thus the difference between
the implicit and the explicit tariff (including other charges) multiplied by the
nominal exchange rate.
4. Nominal tariff: The tariff—either explicit or implicit as specified—
on a commodity.
5. Effective tariff: The explicit or implicit tariff on value added as dis-
tinct from the nominal tariff on a commodity. This concept is also expressed
as the effective rate of protection (ERP) or as the effective protective rate
(EPR).
6. Domestic resource costs (DRC): The value of domestic resources
(evaluated at "shadow" or opportunity cost prices) employed in earning or
saving a dollar of foreign exchange (in the value-added sense) when produc-
ing domestic goods.
DELINEATION OF PHASES USED IN TRACING THE
EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
To achieve comparability of analysis among different countries, each author
of a country study was asked to identify the chronological development of hisDEFINITION OF CONCEPTS AND DELINEATION OF PHASES 349
country's payments regime through the following phases. There was no pre-
sumption that a country would necessarily pass through all the phases in
chronological sequence.
Phase I: During this period, quantitative restrictions on international
transactions are imposed and then intensified. They generally are initiated in
response to an unsustainable payments deficit and then, for a period, are in-
tensified. During the period when reliance upon quantitative restrictions as a
means of controlling the balance of payments is increasing, the country is said
to be in Phase I.
Phase 11: During this phase, quantitative restrictions are still intense, but
various price measures are taken to offset some of the undesired results of the
system. Heightened tariffs, surcharges on imports, rebates for exports, special
tourist exchange rates, and other price interventions are used in this phase.
However, primary reliance continues to be placed on quantitative restrictions.
Phase 11!: This phase is characterized by an attempt to systematize the
changes which take place during Phase II. It generally starts with a formal
exchange-rate change and may be accompanied by removal of some of the
surcharges, etc., imposed during Phase II and by reduced reliance upon quan-
titative restrictions. Phase III may be little more than a tidying-up operation
(in which case the likelihood is that the country will re-enter Phase II), or it
may signal the beginning of withdrawal from reliance upon quantitative re-
strictions.
Phase IV: If the changes in Phase III result in adjustments within the
country, so that liberalization can continue, the country is said to enter Phase
IV. The necessary adjustments generally include increased foreign-exchange
earnings and gradual relaxation of quantitative restrictions. The latter relaxa-
tion may take the form of changes in the nature of quantitative restrictions
or of increased foreign-exchange allocations, and thus reduced premiums, un-
dec the same administrative system.
Phase V: This is a period during which an exchange regime is fully lib-
eralized. There is full convertibility on current account, and quantitative re-
strictions are not employed as a means of regulating the ex ante balance of
payments.
4